A. INTRODUCTION
There is little doubt that directors' standards of loyalty in UK company law were traditionally owed to the company itself. 1 Although there has been much discussion about what is meant by "the company", 2 it seems that the courts in general deferred to managerial discretion as to what was best considered to serve a company's overall interests in any given instance. 3 This administrative discretionary authority ensured governance. It is commonly reasoned, instead, that in those instances where the pursuit of shareholder value produces negative externalities, "corrections" should be made not by reforming the fabric of company law itself but, instead, through alternative "public" environmental regulation. 10 This has been an important reason why regulatory regimes aimed at environmental protection were developed.
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Certainly, when we look inside the rules and structures of UK environmental law, we see very clearly that it is an extensive mixture of more traditional forms of statutory precepts, but also an increasing focus on decentred forms of voluntary regulation and co-operative governance approaches to environmental protection. In addition, environmental law, and the underlying philosophy of the instruments that have been relied upon, is engaged in a symbiotic exchange of ideas and pursuits with company law rule making and corporate culture. This suggests an environmental liability regime that has the potential to re-balance the obligations and powers of companies, but also to influence the way in which these business enterprises define and prioritise their responsibilities. However, it is submitted that, for a number of reasons, environmental law and policy has achieved only limited developments and successes in displacing the dominant idea that corporate boards must and should base their actions on the exclusive interests of shareholders.
While no attempt is made in this article to speak to the more broad and complex problems of the ideologically staid climate in company law or to expand the mandate 10 Henry Hansmann and Reinier Kraakman, 'The End of History for Corporate Law' (2000) 89 Geo LJ 439 at 442; Len Sealy, 'Directors' "Wider" Responsibilities -Problems Conceptual, Practical and Procedural ' (1987) of environmental law, an understanding of these legal domains does inform several of the points underlined. In particular, it is important to identify the background state of legal normality against which economic concerns sit uneasily with environmental safeguards. Moreover, an exposition and analysis of these two areas of law foregrounds the regulatory space that has in recent years given rise to the business community generating its own governance initiatives to address growing anxiety about the contribution of commercial actors toward environmental degradation and natural resource depletion. In this regard, most large, modern companies now promulgate voluntary unilateral assurances about environmentally responsible behaviour, which take the form of environmental responsibility policies, sustainability reports, and internal ethics codes. 12 In a practical sense, these self-regulatory products are undertaken by companies to demonstrate a societal commitment to protect the environment in their global operations. On a philosophical level, they purport to mediate the broader, complex relationship between company law and private ordering, and environmental regulation and values. In doing so, they highlight the structural necessity to the environmental relation of managerial norms in favour of balancing privatised gains and externalised risk to the natural world. Yet in spite of clear promise, there is currently nothing in law to prevent companies from acting inconsistently with these voluntary unilateral assurances, which has led to widespread scepticism that environmental concerns or values are treated as merely instrumental to the overall objective of achieving economic benefits for the company. The purpose of this article is thus to provide a specific case for the facilitation of an enforceable legal right, in certain situations, to be conferred on the natural world, which will ensure that companies are more accountable for the environmental statements or actions when no such obligation exists within formal areas of law. It examines the compelling case for deploying the doctrine of estoppel, which is a legal principle in common law legal systems whereby a person is precluded from asserting
something contrary to what is implied by a previous action or statement of that person. The article argues that if a company has produced statements or actions about the governance of environmental risk, and this can be reasonably taken to have induced reliance and expectation, then that company should be "estopped" from defaulting on its commitment. On a more general level, it is hoped that the article will further frame our understanding of what private law can in fact do to fundamentally interact with regulation relating to environmental issues in a way that is currently missing. This could come at no more an urgent time than now, when there is a pressing need for workable and sustainable solutions to environmental inequality in corporate decision-making. It is of course recognised that doubts might exist as to whether the environment itself is readily or plausibly capable of being a rights holder. This point warrants consideration and it will be addressed in some detail later in the article.
14 The rest of the article proceeds as follows. Part B provides an examination of the manner in which economic thinking has influenced the trajectory of UK company law. The sources and contours of this discussion are set out in broad terms, and only to the extent necessary to illustrate the point that the exclusive interests of 14 See the text accompanying notes 89-101 below.
shareholders are internalised within corporate governance processes to the exclusion of pressing environmental concerns. Part C provides a brief overview and analysis of UK environmental law in order to highlight the conceptual, intellectual, and practical challenges confronting public regulation of commercial actors that externalise environmental risk. Parts D and E seek to examine from a corrective justice perspective how the doctrine of estoppel can be used in certain situations to oblige a company to internalise environmental risk when it has provided voluntary unilateral commitments about environmental sustainability. Part F offers some concluding remarks.
B. THE CONTRACTARIAN INFLUENCE ON UK COMPANY LAW
The courts have frequently asserted that directors are empowered agents of the company, with which they are situated in a fiduciary relationship. 15 It is of course trite that, for over a century, companies have been regarded as having distinct juristic personality. 16 In the fierce controversy over corporate personhood, however, one truism resounds through the literature: a company has 'no soul to be damned and no body to be kicked.' 17 This has generated problems of accountability of corporate boards in company law and scholarship. It is fair to suggest that the ability of the contractarian approach to provide a complete account of the anatomy of company law is not without its opponents. 43 The majority of opinions have expressed disagreement about the doctrinal significance of shareholder value, 44 while others objected to the normative accent given to economic efficiency. 45 Yet the fact remains that contractarian theory has been highly influential upon the fundamental and enduring debate as to how we should view the company, 46 and it has found favour in various significant policy-making discussions that go to the heart of UK company law and practice. 47 Moreover, the rules of company law itself comprise many different elements that appear to give credence to a private contractual view of the company. Most notably, the company's articles of association contain primarily internal governance rules providing for its constitutional structure and distribution of power between the board and the shareholder body. The rules set out in the corporate constitution are contractual terms upon which the shareholders agree to become associated with the company. 48 Perhaps unsurprisingly UK law views the legal status of the constitution in contractual terms, 49 and this conclusion resonates with a number of judicial pronouncements that 'acknowledge contract as the animating force within company law.' 50 Overall, then, the theoretical model that is generally posited by commentators attempting to understand company law from a private contractual perspective remains hugely significant in providing the discipline's vantage point for understanding and assessing that law.
C. THE LIMITATIONS OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND GOVERNANCE
The previous section illustrated how a highly influential strand of company law theorising, which seeks to conceive of company law in private terms, not only colours the substance and interpretation of the law, but this framework also prioritises the values and concerns of shareholders at board and managerial levels. It will be recalled that asserting the exclusive primacy of shareholders in company law does not imply that the extra contractual values or concerns of the environment must or should go unprotected. There is little doubt that virtually every sector of corporate activity across the globe, through capitalism's need to proliferate and profit, is responsible for consuming significant amounts of finite resources and energy, and causing waste accumulation and resource degradation. 51 The typical underlying normative claim from a law and economics perspective suggests that the only available means of protection lies outside company law, specifically within the domain of environmental law and policy. 52 This has been an important determinant of the development of the UK environmental law framework. 53 The purpose of this section is thus to examine and comment on the extent to which domestic environmental law regulates or contains the negative impacts of companies on the environment, particularly at board level, and whether companies are answerable for their decisions, practices, and outcomes in a way that is not presently conceived within the company law framework. It does not offer a complete appraisal of UK environmental legislation, regulation and governance. Rather, this section identifies and evaluates the dominant approach of this body of law, and the underlying philosophy of the instruments that have been relied upon, to achieve environmentally sound conduct of companies. This is done only to the extent necessary to highlight the tensions within and shortcomings of traditional legal doctrine and more recent environmental governance arrangements that seek to regulate corporate enterprises. about sustainable environmental performance, the next section will provide a practical first step in facilitating an enforceable legal right, in certain situations, to be conferred on the natural world, which will ensure that companies are more accountable for the environmental statements or actions being made. In particular, it can be argued that the doctrine of estoppel is capable of being displaced from the realm of contract or equity and pressed into service in an emblematic, divisive area of commercial activity that is an important site for the decisions, practices, and outcomes of companies. Before we discuss the proposed remedy it is important to say a few words about the question of whether, and to what extent, the environment itself is capable of being considered as a legal rights-holder. Much ink has of course been spilled on this philosophical and practical issue. This is ostensibly because granting certain legal entitlements to the environment necessarily endows it with legal personhood. There is considerable support at first sight for the natural world to be regarded as a putative legal "thing", which has intrinsic ethical or moral claims to legal rights. 89 Yet the notion that the environment can have a legal, financial, or participatory role in the affairs of the company presents real-world difficulties. 90 At the very least this is because the natural world is a site of multi-faceted elements, processes, and ecosystems, which, in their own right, are not straightforwardly translated into legal institutional design. 91 Another impediment is that as a natural object the environment is incapable of having constitutional standing. 92 Nonetheless, the paradigm debate above is premised upon a simplistic "post hoc fallacy", which depicts legal personhood as an expression of some uniquely defining attribute of human nature.
E. AN ESTOPPEL BASED ENVIRONMENTAL ACTION
This reasoning lacks or elides the obvious point that that the legal person is not necessarily a natural person, 93 and it suffers from intellectual myopia in being unable to see that such conceptions are already part of the law. 94 This prompts two closely related observations. 95 The first is the doctrinal understanding that natural things have at some points, in some legal systems, been accorded legal status and, second, the normative claim that certain natural things in addition to humans should have legal standing. These observations buttress our argument that the category of legal person can and should be extended to include the natural environment, which more plausibly connects it to legal rights-holding.
As a functional compromise, it is likely that political or deliberative engagement by private environmental claimants might constitute a precondition for the enjoyment of these rights, but it is recognised that the 'multiple, overlapping and often uncertain with all parties involved in decision-making processes, and ongoing oversight of the legal complaint. Beyond this, because constitutional standing is essentially derivative of the rights of the natural environment, it would require private environmental claimants to eschew human self-interested and economic preferences and, instead, point to "environmental" injury. 101 The court could consider a claim, it is argued, provided that the request for action establishes in a plausible manner that environmental damage exists and is capable of remedial action. This approach would necessarily produce the consequence that the environment itself would be the direct recipient of any outcome remedy from the court, although this does not preclude indirect benefits to peoples or communities affected by the environmental controversy. wholly independent. 106 The minutiae of that question are outside the scope of this inquiry, but we can identify in broad terms a common basis underlying the varieties of estoppel, which is explained by the very raison d'être of the doctrine. It is, in essence, a judicial remedy that stems from the basic moral idea for achieving consistency; 107 historical precedent clearly establishes that when a party to a legal controversy whose words or conduct have induced another to believe in a particular state of affairs, he or she may be precluded from attempting to act inconsistently with the assumptions thereby engendered when it would be unfair or unconscionable to do so. 108 The rights of the parties are then determined by reference to the assumed state of affairs. Therefore, estoppel precludes a party from asserting something contrary to what was implied by their previous statements or actions. In its classical form, the remedy is a powerful one and may often be dispositive of the substantive outcome of the dispute. Although estoppel does rest on certain basic factual elements in any given case, as a discretionary equitable remedy it is by its nature an astonishingly versatile device, not subject to overly restrictive rules that would diminish its effectiveness. Indeed, few doctrines are so 'potentially fruitful', 109 and while estoppel is 'more often cited than applied, and more often applied than understood', 110 it is the coherent medium through which non-contractual expectations are fulfilled, either wholly or in part. declaration. 115 While there has been much academic and practitioner fervour preoccupied with the conventional distinctions between types of assurance, a persuasive strand of recent thinking suggests that we should abandon the notion that estoppel is dependent upon a particular form of assurance, and focus on the fact that an expectation interest has arisen. 116 This means the focus of the law is not necessarily upon the form of voluntary unilateral assurance by a company, but instead centres on the effect of words, or conduct, upon the commons and the public interest.
This prompts the question of whether a company's voluntary unilateral assurances can in fact constitute an effective representation that is capable of being reasonably understood in a particular sense and under normal circumstances induces an expectation that a certain state of affairs exists. It is trite that assurances in estoppel and contractual offers must in general satisfy the requirement of certainty. Yet it is also true that under estoppel the court is exercising an equitable jurisdiction and thus is not restricted to the same rigid conditions of form. 117 The classic test of an effective assurance in estoppel is that it must be 'clear enough' 118 to produce an expectation that can be ascertained and described. In other words a company's environmental citizenship dialogue would not to be held to something that might be interpreted perversely or speculatively. 119 While a mixture of different interpretations might exist, it will not preclude an expectation from arising, provided that one of these meanings 130 Overall, when a company has produced statements or actions similar to the examples above, it is submitted that it could satisfy the requirement of being sufficiently clear and straightforward dialogue. In a number of situations, this in turn could reasonably produce or reinforce a noncontractual expectation about a particular state of affairs, such as a belief that the company has made a commitment to preserving water quality or proper handling, recycling, and disposing of waste.
The second condition for estoppel is that a company's voluntary unilateral assurance needs to be the kind of material communication that can be reasonably taken to have induced reliance on a particular expectation about the company's governance of 126 Ibid at 58. 142 This relates to the intrinsic jurisdiction to restrain injustice. But the broad framing of unconscionability means that precise explanations of its centrality within the overall doctrine of estoppel, and thus its role within successful estoppels, is almost always hidden or half-articulated in the various judgments, particularly when compared to the treatment given to the more factual elements of assurance or expectation. 143 However, there are two closely related principles relating to unconscionability, which provide an evaluative framework for assessing the court's multi-faceted inquiry. The first point is a simple one and depicts unconscionability as the going back on an assurance about formality; this in turn justifies the discarding of formality rules that would otherwise apply.
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This is likely to be established if a company's voluntary unilateral assurance amounts to: (i) a 'sufficiently precise' 145 declaration about the company's environmental goals and responsibilities, and; (ii) it can be reasonably taken to have produced an expectation that the company intends to act consistently with its commitments. In essence, a company's statements or actions to behave in a certain way in respect to environmental performance constitutes a non-contractual obligation, but to act inconsistently with this declaration partially leads to a presumption of unconscionability or unfairness.
The second part of the court's evaluative judgment about the existence of unconscionability is more complex, and relates to the issue of whether the assurance can reasonably be taken to have induced reliance or prompted a change of position.
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As discussed above, a much-debated legal issue is whether, and to what extent, the natural world can be regarded as a putative legal "thing", which is capable of having constitutional legal standing. 147 This article submitted that the category of legal person could and should be extended to include the natural environment, which more plausibly connects it to legal rights-holding. However, it does not follow that the environment can change position on the basis of a company's statements or actions about sustainable environmental behaviour. The functional solution offered submits that ecologically motivated citizens could represent the diverse "interests" of the natural world, and this is already the case in a number of instances. Because this 144 despite placing trust in the statements or actions about sustainable environmental use of Southeast Asian pulp and paper companies that are the main driving force behind that deforestation. 150 The upshot is that, in many cases of reliance, the position alteration of the ecologically motivated citizens, based on a company's assurances, often might be construed as forming the second aspect of unconscionability.
Where all the elements necessary to give rise to an equitable estoppel have been established, the effect of an estoppel is said to be to confer an "equity" to remedy the legal controversy. This raises two additional questions: namely, what is the extent of the "equity", and what are the remedies for non-performance of voluntary unilateral assurance about the governance of environmental risk. 151 In practice these questions tend to be conflated; but they will be addressed separately for ease of exposition. The first inquiry is a straightforward one that can be answered summarily. When a statement or action gives rise to an estoppel, the parties must be dealt with on the footing that the assurance is true. But this pretence does not make it true, and it may be necessary for the company to do something further in order to bring that about. It is trite that the effect of estoppel, in many of the cases, is to give rise to a binding obligation when no such obligation exists within formal areas of law. Turning to the second question, although the court has considerable discretion in respect to the appropriate remedy in cases of estoppel, that discretion is not a 'completely unfettered' 155 one and a 'principled approach' 156 is exercised. In giving effect to the "equity" it is traditionally thought that there must be proportionality between the expectation and the detriment. 157 For the purposes of achieving such proportionality regard must be given to the precision of the assurance, which can then help to ascribe the measure of expectation and reliance to the defendant. 158 It should be noted, however, that there is no requirement that expectation or reliance take a particular form, and the current position is that it need not consist of quantifiable economic loss, which means that non-economic detriment to the environment will suffice. 159 If we imagine specific and less specific assurances at opposite ends of a spectrum, when the assurance is indeterminate or provided with qualifications, then it will be more difficult to ascribe a proportionate degree of expectation and reliance to the defendant, which will of course limit the extent of relief granted. 160 to provide a suitable basis for a claim to succeed. When these conditions exist, the doctrine of estoppel, as a form of discretionary remedialism, permits the courts to award the appropriate remedy in the circumstances of each individual case. 163 It will be remembered that corporate environmental dialogue is becoming increasingly ubiquitous, and formulated in order to bring about significant outcome-benefits (to the extent of being crucial to a company's social or public "licence" to operate, even in the face of increased exposure to liability as is considered in this article) from society generally. 164 In a world that is increasingly and ever more closely integrated, such corporate statements or actions are highly visible and thus can be said to target, and come to the attention of, almost all areas of the globe where the company operates. 165 In this regard, the application of a valid estoppel provides a practical first step in this specific challenge of addressing how companies might better conform to societal expectations based on the way they have held themselves out in respect of the governance of environmental risk.
A related final point is that while there are limits to the substantive and structural aspects of private law, 166 in a number of instances this branch of law is understood to operate as a successful mode of environmental protection. 167 There are at least three important arguments in support of private law doctrine and private law litigation. 168 First, private rights can be used to protect a broader range of concerns than public regulatory measures. Second, there is a symbolic importance attached to private law actions, whereby mainstream law provides fundamental recognition of the apportionment of rights and remedies in relation to environmental protection. Finally, private law actions provide a way to agitate for legal change on behalf of individual litigants in a way that does not depend upon a legislature or administrative body deciding to protect something. With this in mind, the doctrine of estoppel is already used extensively in UK law 169 and, it is submitted, the internal flexibility 170 and underlying emphasis on restraining injustice 171 is conceptually relevant to the governance of corporate environmental risk. If we look across the Atlantic, a useful point of reference is evident in a line of corporate law cases involving shareholders suing the directors. Implicit in these authorities is the very logic of estoppel, which provides a compelling case that a board might be prohibited from acting inconsistently with its previous assurances to shareholders if it would be unfair or unconscionable to do so. 172 Of course, an application of estoppel to environmental controversies presents a purely practical misalignment with its pre-existing use, but that could be remedied with a creative judicial application of the law. Certainly, there is some acceptance amongst senior members of the judiciary that the courts 'have a 168 From the broader scope of private law to the issues of justice not dependent upon the organs of the State, these points follow Fisher, et al, ibid at 245. 169 The doctrine has been involved with various commercially-oriented areas of law, such as with the law of contract and consideration; land law; another with trusts and other equitable doctrines; a further liaison has long existed with bailment and the law of agency; nemo dat conflicts; and a significant link can also be discovered with the tort of misrepresentation. vital role to play in the protection of the environment.' 173 More broadly, the courts have been assessing the actions of directors and managers for many years and, as recognised elsewhere, they are now more adept at doing so than ever before.
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F. CONCLUSION
This article has mapped the significant, complex legal interactions between the doctrinal and normative order of modern UK company law and the extant environmental liability regime, tracking the path of this relationship to a background state of legal normality against which economic concerns sit uneasily with public safeguards for the natural world. While no attempt has been made to speak to the more broad and complex problems of the ideologically staid climate in company law or to expand the mandate of environmental law, this article has demonstrated that the legal situation above has created a regulatory space. Against this philosophical and practical divide, the business community has generated its own self-regulatory governance initiative to address growing anxiety about the contribution of commercial actors toward environmental degradation and natural resource depletion.
This at first sight represents an attractive ideal that purports to instantiate a mixture of environmental goals and responsibilities, particularly at board level, in a way that is not adequately provided for within existing aspects of law. examined the case for the legal facilitation an enforceable right, in certain situations, to be conferred on the natural world, which will ensure that companies are more accountable for their environmental commitments when no such obligation exists within formal areas of law. It sought to demonstrate that this is possible through the common law doctrine of estoppel, which can be opened up to prevent a company from acting inconsistently with its previous statements or actions about the governance of environmental risk. It is hoped that the constitute elements and legal plausibility of this idea have been established, but of course the legal rules and nuances of implementing it in practice need to be more clearly defined in subsequent debate.
